Immigration law is traditionally understood to encompass the rules that govern foreign citizens' entry into and departure from the United States, and may therefore be seen as an important domestic arm of the nation's foreign policy power. Immigration law is the exclusive purview of the federal government t While there are times when federal law might have unintended effects upon noncitizens, 2 as a vehicle for effectuating foreign policy, immigration law can serve as an effective complement. For example, if the U.S. declares war on Iraq, it might make sense to exclude all Iraqi citizens from immigrating to the United States, not just for our own citizens' security, but for theirs as well. But what should our immigration laws say when the object of our foreign policy is not another nation, but a multinational guerrilla movement such as alQaeda? How does the U.S. balance its national security concerns against fair treatment of the individual noncitizens affected by its immigration laws? Just last year, Congress passed a law requiring greater scrutiny of visa applications 1. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (upholding a federal statute regulating immigration as a constitutional exercise of the foreign commerce clause power). With the recent passage of federal legislation in the areas of welfare reform and crime that have arguably devolved some power over alienage to the states, a recent New York University symposium has asked whether such devolution of immigration power is desirable. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Devolution and Discrimination, 58 from nationals of countries that sponsor terrorist activity. 3 Clearly, not every visa applicant from North Korea is a terrorist, and yet it would be imprudent not to consider North Korea's past practices in ruling upon the application. On the other hand, is it fair to subject every single person from North Korea to increased scrutiny in the name of fighting terrorism when we are not (nor will we likely be) at war with North Korea? And what of North Koreans who might already be in this country? Should they all be deported, detained and screened for possible deportation, or interrogated about their links to terrorism?
II. IMMIGRATION AS A TOOL IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
In what ways may our immigration laws requiring the exclusion or removal of noncitizens assist in the war on terrorism? Even if technological advances permitted us to infallibly determine whether a noncitizen was a terrorist or not, would immigration law be used to either exclude that individual at the border or remove her from the country? In close cases, the answer is probably "no." On the one hand, ridding the nation of a dangerous individual prevents her from directly threatening the country; on the other, deporting the terrorist means she is still at large, allowing her to strike another day either directly (by entering without authorization across the border) or indirectly (by abetting a plan to be carried out by stateside associates). Indeed, our government is even willing to go beyond our borders to capture alleged terrorists who were never subject to our immigration controls in the first place. The government's obsession with capturing Osama bin Laden, as well as the recent slew of arrests of alleged alQaeda henchmen in Singapore 4 and Pakistan, 5 are examples of the lengths to which the government will strive to secure peace. In perhaps a less well-known example, the Washington Post reported that last year the government had interrogated a noncitizen who was discovered to be an al-Qaeda operative long Sept. 17, 2002 , at A 14. 5. Michael Elliot, Reeling Them In, TIME, Sept. 23, 2002 after he had left the United States.
6 Thus, as a theoretical matter, if the government discovers a particularly dangerous terrorist among the noncitizens it is investigating, it will likely invoke its criminal laws to prosecute the person for treason or subversion, rather than its immigration powers to deport or exclude.
Why, then, has Attorney General Ashcroft used immigration proceedings to seek out terrorists? Following the September 11 attacks, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrested and detained approximately one thousand mostly Arab and Muslim noncitizens for immigration code violations in an effort to uncover possible terrorists among them. 7 Notwithstanding the questionable desirability of deporting a known terrorist, using immigration rather than criminal proceedings to screen persons makes sense from the government's perspective. First, the process gives the government the most number of remedial options: if it decides a noncitizen is not a terrorist, it can deport her; if she is a terrorist, it can charge her criminally. In addition, the government is able to take advantage of the administrative and civil nature of immigration proceedings to aggressively prosecute its claims without providing as much due process protection to the individuals charged. terrorist links in the context of deportation than if it had to proceed in a criminal court. Second, given its limited resources and the similar profiles of the 9/11 bombers (all young, male Middle Eastern nationals 0 ), focusing government efforts on immigration violators provides it with a legitimate method for killing two birds with one stone: the government is able to enforce our immigration laws while simultaneously enhancing our national security (or at least attempting to do so"'). Third, the government implicitly knows that by targeting immigration violators only, 12 it likely has the support of the majority of the public still grieving after 9/11 3 and the backing of constitutional immigration law, which has left decisions regarding the ingress and egress of noncitizens to the political branches.' Sept. 8, 2002 , at AI ("Americans increasingly doubt that their government has done enough to protect them against terrorist attacks .. "). Some polled, like Mary Wool, believe that enhanced security at airports, for instance, is "just harassment and to make people think they are doing something." Id. 13. In the N.Y. Times poll cited supra note 11, two-fifths of the respondents believed that the government had not done enough since 9/11 to protect them against another terrorist attack; one of those polled suggested initiating "things like background checks on people who go in and out of the country" as a means by which such additional security could be achieved. Clymer & Elder, supra note 1I, at Al. Indeed, the government's aggressive investigation of Hatfill suggests that, had it more resources and were it not necessary to provide more criminal due process, perhaps it would treat just as seriously perceived national security threats by U.S. citizens as it would those by noncitizens. Ashcroft's lobbying Congress for broader investigatory powers immediately after 9/11 supports this view. See supra note 12.
17. Of course, this unequal press coverage might be more a reflection of the press's priorities than existing reality. See supra text accompanying note 15 (arguing inordinate amount of attention paid to Lindh and Padilla when general media coverage of domestic U.S. citizen terrorism receives little press coverage as compared to investigations of noncitizens). But while it is possible that the government is pursuing with equal fervor the investigation of U.S. citizen-based terrorism, 1, for one, am skeptical that this is actually happening.
country writ large. The sacrifice of the few is worth the well-being of the many. Of course, this argument would be more persuasive if the government could show definitively that the terms "terrorist" and "immigration violator" are synonymous, or that there is a sufficiently high correlation between the two. As the Lindh and Padilla cases remind us, the government's case is based, at best, on educated guesses and statistical probabilities, and at worst, on stereotypical presumptions. 8 On the latter point, Ashcroft's Arab-Muslim immigration dragnet exacerbates racial, religious, and gender stereotypes. As many have documented, exclusively targeting certain groups, even among noncitizens, is unacceptably both over-and under-inclusive. 19 Targeting certain groups is overinclusive because interrogating and detaining thousands of noncitizens based on accidents of birth offends our notions of liberal equality and individual civil rights. It is also underinclusive because, as mentioned before, there are U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals who may also be terrorist threats. 20
IV. PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE WAR AGAINST IMMIGRANT TERRORISM: AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE COURTS
As a final rejoinder, the government might respond that in enacting and enforcing general immigration policy, it has no choice but to paint wide brush strokes. Congressional statutes are inherently broad so as to be of sufficiently general applicability. Executive enforcement strategies are equally so in order to provide sufficient flexibility to personnel. Indeed, our constitutional immigration law sanctions such extensive power, understanding that the political branches have the institutional competence to best engage in foreign relations, to which 18. See supra note 15. .. thwart potential terrorist activity any way we can,' U.S. Attorney Michael Sullivan said after the verdict was returned -marking the first conviction nationwide under the 6-month-old Patriot Act. 'One way is to disrupt the flow of money to terrorist organizations."'); see also Cole, supra note 14, at 1002 (noting that pursuant to the USA Patriot Act, the federal government has aggressively investigated two U.S.-based holding companies for their alleged financial support of terrorism). Similarly, the government should not neglect domestic terrorism networks such as hate groups that have financial links to antiimmigration organizations. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), for example, has traced the funding of several anti-immigration groups, some of which have been designated by the SPLC as hate groups, to Dr. John Tanton, a Michigan physician. See Southern Poverty Law Center, The Puppeteer, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Summer 2002, at 44-51 ("The organized anti-immigration ,movement,' increasingly in bed with racist hate groups, is dominated by one man.") available at http :/ww'v.splcenter.org/intelligenceprject/ip-indexhtml. immigration law is linked through its regulation of migrants. Moreover, there are no significant signs that the public is willing to shelve immigration policy as a weapon in the war against terrorism, and thus we cannot expect that the political branches 22 will either. And perhaps that is as it should be. Our national policies, for better or worse, are determined by our representative government, duly elected by our voting public, and in theory, they try to capture majoritarian sentiment. If, despite the apparent flaws in implementation, most of the public feels comfortable using immigration law to combat terrorism, then our republican democracy should support that. More interestingly, the support for Ashcroft's anti-immigrant, profilecharged dragnet may have a broader base than simply among middle-class white American voters. While most post-1965 immigration has come from Asia and Latin America, and while racial profiling has been roundly denounced by many in the African-and Latino/a-American communities, immigration policy has long been a contested playing field. Thus, it may very well be that the much touted demographic "browning" of America may not lead to better treatment of noncitizens, especially post-9/l 1, for a number of reasons. First, Professor Angela Dillard has documented the growth of a multicultural conservative movement 23 exemplified most visibly perhaps by several of Bush's key cabinet members-Colin Powell (Secretary of State), Condoleeza Rice (National Security Adviser), and Norman Mineta (Secretary of Transportation)-that might, at the margin, be more sympathetic to national security concerns linked to restricting immigration than to more traditional egalitarian principles. Second, both lawful and undocumented immigration will likely continue to be wedge issues among and within communities of color. Many African Americans oppose even lawful immigration on the grounds that it affects native blacks' employment prospects, 24 while recent immigrants from Asia and Latin America are often 21. See supra note 8.
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. Note, however, that the political branches have not completely abdicated leadership in protecting immigrant rights even post-9/1 1. For example, realizing that the Patriot Act's implicit prohibition against foreign students enrolling in part-time classes would have had a devastating effect upon part-time commuter residents along the Canadian and Mexican border, Congress passed the Border Commuter Student Act, Pub. L. 107-274, 116 Stat. 1923 107-274, 116 Stat. (2002 , which creates a new class of nonimmigrant visas for such students. 24. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans, and Latinos as "Foreigners," and Social Change: Is Law The Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347, 359-60 (1997) .
See generally
In more modem times, African Americans, fearing that immigration adversely impacts their community by driving down wages, supported restrictionist immigration laws and policies that have disproportionate impacts on immigration from Asia and Latin America. In addition, conflict between Blacks and Asians in South Central Los Angeles and between Blacks and Latinos in other parts of the country have provided fuel to calls for immigration restriction. (internal citations omitted).
unsympathetic to civil rights claims by undocumented immigrants 25 (hence the popularity of California's Proposition 187 eliminating many public benefits for undocumented persons during the early 1990s). Following 9/11, Time magazine reported undocumented Mexican laborers upset at the enhanced border security wrought by the terrorist attacks, blaming the situation on the "damn Arabs." 26 Thus, Ashcroft will find some unlikely allies even among citizens and immigrants of color.
While the likelihood that vigilant immigration enforcement will continue to be the majority's will, our country also subscribes to an equality principle designed to protect the least powerful among us. The under-policing of U.S. citizen terrorists, and the perpetuation of invidious stereotypes evident in our current immigration policy, undermines equality in two ways. First, because immigration law is premised on the unequal status of U.S. citizens and noncitizens, broad policies that apply only to noncitizens, even those enacted in the name of national security, are likely to widen the citizen-noncitizen divide and enhance tensions between the two groups.
27 Second, to the extent that most U.S. immigrants today are people of color from Asia and Latin America, the unintended burden of stringent immigration enforcement will fall upon racial outsiders, exacerbating tensions between whites and nonwhites.
28
Fortunately, there is an integral institution in our democracy designed and particularly well-suited to protect individual claimants-the federal courts. While they have long deferred to Congress and the Executive in setting immigration policy, the courts have not shied away from providing needed checks and balances in instances of political branch overreaching. 27. Ethnic, racial, and religious profiling drives a wedge between citizens and noncitizens in communities of color. For example, rather than challenging anti-immigrant laws, U.S. citizens of Arab descent might seek to avoid further scrutiny by privileging their citizenship status over their ethnicity, unintentionally leaving their noncitizen counterparts, many of whom are innocent, subject to more intense scrutiny. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 14, at 997-98 (describing the case of a woman who was able to avoid deportation due to her allegedly subversive writings by successfully proving her U.S. citizenship).
28. As Professor Cole has stated, "What we are willing to do to noncitizens ultimately affects what we are willing to do to citizens. In the long run, all of our rights are at stake in the war against courts have curbed Executive zealotry by slowing down the juggernaut, forcing the Attorney General to follow time-honored due process procedures. First, the federal Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court chided the FBI for misleading the courts in seventy-five alleged terrorism cases, all of which involved noncitizens.
30 Second, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court decision opening immigration proceedings to the public and press unless the INS could prove specific threats to national security.
3
' It is fitting that in the second case, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the opinion was penned by Sixth Circuit Judge Damon Keith, an African-American jurist long supportive of civil rights. 32 As Congress and the Executive Branch continue to experiment with how to prudently and effectively use their immigration power in the war against terrorism, 33 it will be up to the federal courts to ensure that individual and non-U.S. citizens is likely impossible because these groups are by definition not similarly situated for purposes of immigration law. However, outside of immigration law -the law affecting general civil rights -foreigners and citizens are both groups of autonomous individuals linked together by the mutual desire to be treated equally under the law. Of course, the problem with the equal protection claim is that equality may be achieved by eliminating the disadvantages visited upon the minority group or by increasing the disadvantages suffered by the majority. (2002) (the lower court approved, with conditions, the Attorney General's request for broader surveillance powers consistent with the Patriot Act, and the appeals panel removed those conditions). Although the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review reversed the lower court, granting the Attorney General's motion to remove any of the lower court's conditions on its surveillance requests, the appeals panel did not overturn the lower court's finding that the FBI had misled the court in approximately seventy-five cases for which it sought court approval pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Id. Professor Raquel Aldana-Pindell explores the scope of the executive branch's exercise of its national security powers versus its criminal law enforcement powers, arguing that the current, domestic so-called "war on terrorism" should be viewed to be the latter, subjecting executive action to greater judicial scrutiny. See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11 "National Security" Cases: 32. There is, of course, no guarantee that a judge of color will be more vigilant in curbing excessive executive and legislative zeal; one need think only of Justice Clarence Thomas to realize the danger of such essentialist thinking. Indeed, immigration has long been a wedge issue between people of color (e.g., African-Americans against Latino/a-and Asian-Americans) and within certain groups themselves (e.g., there was sizeable Latino support for Proposition 187, California's antiundocumented immigration initiative). But it is also true that many people of color -along with other marginalized groups -understand oppression and inequality, making empathy a true possibility.
33. Alternatives to aggressive immigration enforcement in combating terrorism include the development of better technologies that do not unduly trample individual privacy rights and better utilization of security policies designed to thwart terrorist activity, such as bag-matching at airports. See, e.g., Karen Kaplan, Fighting Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001 , at TI, available at 2001 noncitizens are provided sufficient protection in this post-9/1 I world.
The federal courts have at least four good reasons to be skeptical of the federal political branches, especially during times of real or perceived crisis. First, while the legitimate goal of immigration law enforcement is deportation, Ashcroft's true objective in targeting noncitizens appears to be criminal prosecution for terrorism and subversion. After all, why would the INS risk letting a terrorist get away-which is what the deportation remedy would be 34 - rather than prosecuting him with the goal of life imprisonment or the death penalty? Thus, the constitutional defense of political plenary power is even less persuasive, especially when, as here, the foreign threat comes not from another nation (thus justifying the political branches' plenary international relations power), but instead from a multinational, multiethnic guerilla force that uses unconventional methods of attack, as it did on 9/11. Second, we can well expect that Ashcroft will dispatch criminal law enforcement and immigration agents that might be tempted, at the margin, to play fast and loose with suspects' civil liberties, as evidenced by the FBI's deceptive practices in over seventy-five post-9/lI cases.
35 1 do not mean to suggest bad faith on the agents' part; indeed, I understand that if one believes that one is restoring "the rule of law to the immigration law," 36 as Assistant
Attorney General Viet Dinh has stated, one's noble ends might justify a liberal interpretation of otherwise suspect governmental means. Indeed, the recent decision to split the service and enforcement functions of the INS was prompted in part by the desire to ensure that civil servants long bent on enforcement do not end up in the petition processing section looking for ways to deny admission to family members of lawful permanent residents. 37 It is the role of impartial courts to ensure that the constitutional equality principle is not unduly compromised. Third, history is replete with examples of federal government zealotry, and the federal courts would do well not to bow to majority sentiment especially when racial, ethnic, religious, gender, and age stereotypes are reinforced at the expense of the egalitarian ideal. The legacy of Brown v. Board of Education 38 should be that the Supreme Court will never reaffirm Korematsu's 39 principles. 40 And fourth, controlling political overreaching enhances our standing abroad. As I mentioned at the very beginning of this piece, domestic immigration policy and international relations are indeed interrelated, and as such, if we value human rights at home, our ambassadors abroad will have a stronger case when they accuse other nations of transgressing civil liberties. Nicholas Kristof, describing the near month-long detention without charge or cause of a Yemeni "material witness" married to a U.S. citizen, summarized the argument thusly: "Imprisoning a Yemeni because he is a Yemeni will not destroy our freedoms. But it undermines our ability to project our values abroad."
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